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Abstract 
This study proposes five kinds of game theoretic models of platform-type product service systems considering manufacturing 
viewpoints. Recently, manufacturing industries face a strong trend towards servicizing. One possible solution to manufacturer's 
servicizing is a fusional framework incorporating products and services.  Such a fusional product service system is able to enhance 
product functionality and consumers' satisfaction by constructing appropriate formation of them. Along with this background, our 
preceding study presented categorization of actual business and three basic models, especially focusing on platform-type business 
like smart phones, online music stores and electronic books (Nishino et al. 2012). The current study presents an extension of the 
models and conducts its game-theoretic analysis. Constructing five kinds of platform-type product service system models, the 
present study derives the theoretical equilibrium of each model. Then we discuss the characteristics of each model and 
manufacturers' strategy in platform-type business. 
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1. Introduction 
Manufacturing industries now confront several 
problems like severe price competition, shortening 
product lifecycle, and product commoditization. So 
manufacturers, as indicated with smiling curve 
phenomena, have difficulty in producing value simply 
by assembling production. In addition, customer s 
preferences are diversified and people s lifestyles have 
been changing. Against this background, manufacturers 
have a trend to shift to provision of a whole system 
including service aspects in order to increase product 
value. In this sense, the concept of Product Service 
Systems (PSS) is advocated by Goedkoop et al. [1], 
which explains PSS 
 
Meantime, Industrial Product-Service Systems (IPS2) 
[2] is also studied by many researchers, which deals with 
dynamic interdependencies of products and services in 
production. For example, Rese et al. studied IPS2 using 
net present value approach and real options [3].  Meier et 
al. describes how to build IPS2 network considering 
capacity allocation in business models [4]. Richter et al. 
address flexibility in IPS2, especially considering 
customer-supplier relationships [5]. In addition, service 
engineering has been proposed and studied as well. For 
example, a service CAD system is developed by Arai 
and Shimomura [6,7]. Moreover, Sakao et al. [8] apply 
the methodology of service engineering into 
accommodation service and renting of home appliances. 
As a PSS, our study especially addresses on the 
platform-type PSS. Platform-type business structures 
have been recently emerging in several business scenes. 
For example, some smart phones adopt service provision 
with a platform, in which a lot of contents are available 
for smart phone users. This platform-type structure is 
considered important for manufacturers because physical 
products are essential in order to provide services on that 
platform. Therefore, we elucidate the mechanism of 
platform-type PSS structure.  
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In the field of business administration, related studies
are conducted from a viewpoint of platform . For 
example, Cusumano and Gawer [9] describe platform 
leadership in business circumstances. Additionally,
Evans et al. [10] explain that a software platform is 
invisible engines to be the source of great value to 
consumers. In the meanwhile, an economic theoretical 
- was studied by Richet 
et al. [11], Armstrong [12], Hagiu [13], and others. 
These studies can be regarded as a sort of platform-type
business model. They clarify the theoretical mechanism 
from the viewpoint of economics.
Our preceding research [14] investigated business
models with platform strategies and categorized them 
into several types, especially considering manufacturing
viewpoints. In the research, a basic model framework 
was proposed and three kinds of business structures were 
modeled. The model is comprised of service providers, 
manufacturers, and consumers, which interact one 
another on a common platform. The present study
additionally proposes other two types of platform-type
business structures. Summarizing the preceding models,
our current study redefines them as five kinds of 
platform-type PSS models. Then, game theoretical
analysis demonstrates characteristics, profitability, and
product diffusion in comparison of the five models.
2. Game theoretic approach to PSS
Game theory is one of decision theory that was
originally provided by von Neumann and Morgenstern
[15]. In particular, the theory can treat interdependent 
relationship among decision-makers. Nash equilibrium is
used as a basic solution concept, which is an equilibrium
state where each player behaves rationally considering
others actions. So, it means that the equilibrium is a 
state that any players do not have incentive to deviate.
Although unrealistic assumptions such as perfect
rationality and complete information are often assumed,
the equilibrium concept by the game theoretic approach
is very important because socio-economic systems are
generally formed though interactions among 
stakeholders such as manufacturers, suppliers, and
consumers who are basically economic entities to pursue
profit maximization. Therefore, the equilibrium analysis
can clarify possibility that the structure of PSS can be
successful although it is not sure to attain the 
equilibrium in the real world. 
The PSS studies we mentioned above do not consider 
game theoretic situations. However, the success of PSS
is generally dependent on interactive behavior among
device producers, service providers, and consumers.
Therefore, it is worth considering a game theoretic
situation of PSS. Our study addresses interactions among
stakeholders in platform-type PSS using game theory. 
3. The basic framework of platform-type service 
systems proposed by our preceding study
As defined in the preceding study [14], the present
study also adopts the definition of atform-type service 
syst . The definition is as follows:
Platform-type Product Service Systems is defined 
as a fusional system comprising product 
components and service components that are in
complementary relation and which create no value
with single use, especially having a common 
platform which makes service components
functioning; it is finally provided to customers as
an integrated total system.
Then, based on this definition, the basic framework was 
modeled in the study [14]. The model includes players of 
four kinds: content developers, the platform provider,
the device manufacturer, and consumers. The content
developers produce some content that constitutes service
components which cannot work per se. In the model,
each content developer develops different content from 
others and accordingly various kinds of service
components are available. The device manufacturer 
produces some devices on which the contents work. The
device is represented as a product component. The
platform provider provides a sort of a platform which 
connects the device and the contents, and thereby the 
provider issues license to content developers and/or the
device manufacturer. Fig. 1 depicts the overall view of 
each player s decision and product flow. 
 
Producing devices
Selling contents through 
market platform
: A content developer (Producing contents)
: The platform provider (Issuing licenses and obtaining license fees )
: The market platform for content distribution (online market for sale)
: The device manufacturer (Producing devices)
: A consumer (Purchasing and consuming a product with a content)
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Fig. 1. Basic framework of platform-type PSS by Nishino et al. [14]
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Fig. 2. Five models of platform-type PSS 
4. Five models of platform-type product service 
systems 
4.1. Fundamental structure of each model 
Fig. 2 presents the five models of the platform-type 
PSS we propose. Cases 1 to 3 have already been 
presented in [14] and Cases 4 and 5 are additionally 
presented in the current study.  
In Case 1, the platform provider gives license both to 
content developers and the device manufacturer. The 
device manufacturer produces and sells devices. Since the 
manufacturer is licensed from the provider, the 
manufacturer must pay a license fee to the provider. 
Similarly, the licensed content developers sell their content 
to consumers and pay a fee to the provider. For example, 
business structure like Windows OS is applicable to this 
case.  
In Case 2, the platform provider purchases the device 
from the manufacturer and sells the device to consumers; 
and the licensed content developer sells their content to 
consumers in the same way as Case 1.  Mobile phone 
service in Japan like i-mode is applicable to this case.  
In Case 3, content and platform are embedded into 
devices and products are completed as a total system by 
the device manufacturer. Ordinary home appliances are 
applicable to this case because they often incorporate an 
embedded system into the products. 
In Case 4, the platform provider purchases the device 
and content from respective players and sells it as a 
product. Content developers and the device 
manufacturer just supply the content/device to the 
platform provider. Actually, this case is rarely seen in 
real business. However, this structure is worth 
considering its theoretical mechanism.  
In Case 5, the device manufacturer has an initiative 
and sells products that have several contents which work 
on the platform. This case is similar to Case 3 but it is 
different in that the platform works and the manufacturer 
has to pay a license fee to the platform provider. 
Currently this case is also not so many in the real world 
because development of information communication 
technology now enables content developers and platform 
providers to construct online channels that sell content. 
However, this case is worthy to be treated in terms of 
considering manufacturer s strategy.  
4.2. Description rule for formulation 
Before presenting our model s formulation, we now 
define some parameters and the rule of the indices. jiP  
and jiw  respectively signify the product price and 
wholesale price. Herein, i stands for the player who sets 
the price and j is the player whom player i 
offers: },,,{, Ccdppdmji , where dm, pp, cd, and C 
respectively represent the device manufacturer, platform 
provider, content developer, and consumers. 
4.3. Device manufacturer 
The device manufacturer produces and sells devices. 
The manufacturer must pay a license fee in case of 
licensing from the platform provider. The 
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Therein, dmL , D and S  stands for the license fee, 
, and the supply 
quantity of contents from content developers; c  and Fc  
respectively denote the variable cost and fixed cost for 
production.  
4.4. Platform provider 
The platform provider licenses other players. In cases 
2 and 4, the platform provider directly sells devices to 
consumers by buying them from the device 
manufacturer. Especially in case 3, the provider sells to 
the device manufacturer the set of some contents and its 
platform as a total system to be embedded. In Cases 1 
and 5, the provider gives license to content developers 
and the device manufacturer. The profit is formulated as 
follows.  
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In this formula, cdL  is the license fee to content 
developers; and  is the initial cost to construct the 
platform. 
4.5. Content developers 
In our model, different developers are assumed to sell 
their own content. For simplicity, each content developer 
produces only one kind of content. As such, content 
developer i's profit is defined as follows. 
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Therein, C icdP ,  stands for the content price set by content 
developer i, and if  is the fixed cost. We assume that 
they have no variable cost because content such as 
software can be duplicated easily at almost no expense.  
4.6. Consumers 
In Cases 1 and 2, a consumer purchases content and 
the device separately and thus consumer i's utility is 
formulated as 
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where iv  stands for the reservation price, meaning 
consumer i CiD  stands for 
the number of contents purchased by consumer i; iD  
means a set of content developers whose content 
consumer i has purchased; and C jcdP ,  stands for price for 
content j; )(Sv  is the indirect  network externality 
effect, which depends on the total number of contents 
provided by content developers S . In the formula, the 
first term means that reservation price is decreasing, 
depending on the ratio of the purchased number.  
The idea of network externalities are generally 
defined as a positive externality that is increasing by the 
number of users who purchased the same product [16]. 
In our model, such an effect is explained in the 
following: the spread of contents eventually leads a good 
selection of services and thereby the increasing number 
of contents can enlarge consumer s utility. In this sense, 
we use the term of indirect .  
In the meantime, consumer i in Cases 3, 4 
and 5 is defined as 
4) (Case
5) and 3 (Cases
)(
)(
C
ppi
C
dmi
i PSvv
PSvv
U   
where S  signifies the quantity supplied by content 
developers implying the number of contents embedded 
into the products. If many contents are incorporated into 
the product, then the utility increases according to that 
number. 
5. Game theoretic analysis 
This section derives Nash equilibrium of each model. 
For simplicity, we assume that iv  and if  are uniformly 
distributed in [0, 1] and the cost parameter is 10 c . 
In addition, we define the indirect network externality 
effect as kSSv )( . Here, k  represents the relative 
scale of the network effect, which can be regarded as a 
sort of strength of network. For example, if a service can 
connect users closely by interactive communications like 
SNS, it is a case that k  is large; and if a basic networked 
product like FAX, k  is small. 
5.1. Nash equilibrium 
We obtain the following Nash equilibrium. 
Therein, *cd  stands for the total surplus of all content 
developers: 
i icdcd ,
* . In addition, CS represents 
the  
i i
UCS . 
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 Case 3 
In Case 3, three states are obtained, depending on 
conditions of k and c. 
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In Case 4, three states are obtained, depending on 
conditions of k. 
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In Case 5, four states are obtained, depending on 
conditions of k and c.  
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Fig. 3. Product diffusion at theoretical equilibrium 
394   Nariaki Nishino et al. /  Procedia CIRP  7 ( 2013 )  389 – 394 
 
Fk
ck
dm c22
22
)3(
)1(* , 
22
22
)3(
)1(2*
k
ck
pp
, 
22
22
)3(2
)1(*
k
ck
cd , 
0CS , kckS )1( 3
2 , 0D  
5.2. Comparison of each model 
Fig. 3 collectively depicts the equilibrium state of 
each model regarding S  and D . From the figure, it is 
found that only Cases 1 and 2 realize the state of 1S  
and 1D , meaning all consumers purchase products 
and all kinds of contents are supplied by the content 
developer. In the state of (ii) in Case 4, although 1D  
is realized, S  is less than 1. It means that all consumers 
have purchased but not so many kinds of service content 
are supplied. On the contrary, if 1S  and D  is less 
than 1, it means that service content is provided 
sufficiently but not all consumers purchase products. 
State (ii) in Case 3 is applicable. The business structure 
such as Case 1 or 2 is desirable in terms of PSS diffusion. 
A common characteristic of Cases 1 and 2 is that content 
and devices are separately provided by each independent 
player. Independent availability of service components 
for consumers is important.  
Next, let us compare the device manufacturer s profit 
in each case. Comparing Case 1 (Case 2) with Case 3, 
the profit in Case 1 (Case 2) is greater than that in Case 
3 under the conditions of 2ck . Therefore, the 
device manufacturer can increase profit by introducing 
the platform rather than ordinary embedded systems like 
Case 3. In the other hand, under 2ck , the profit in 
Case 1 (Case 2) is less than that in Case 3. This means 
that, because k  represents the network externality effect, 
the device manufacturer can make profit especially when 
consumers are in a situation where other many 
consumers purchase the same product and thereby 
consumers can easily get benefit from the network effect. 
Such relation is applicable for Cases 4 and 5 as well.  
The platform provider s profit in Cases 1 and 2 is 
2*pp , and therefore the platform provider can 
obtain high profit independent of the parameter of k . It 
implies that the platform provider has an advantage in 
platform-type business. In the meanwhile, if k is small, 
the device manufacturer s profit might be negative. 
Rather the profit is larger in Cases 3, 4, and 5 than that 
in Cases 1 and 2. Only in a situation with large k , the 
device manufacturer can obtain high profit in Cases 1 
and 2. This result indicates that, because platform-type 
business has been recently growing in the real world, 
manufacturers would have disadvantage compared with 
platform providers as long as the network externality 
effect is small. From the viewpoint of manufacturers, it 
is important for manufacturers to be a platform provider 
by taking an initiative to construct its platform.  
6. Conclusion 
This study extends the platform-type PSS model 
provided by our preceding study and totally presents five 
models having different business structures. Game 
theoretic analysis is conducted and obtained theoretical 
equilibrium states. The results demonstrate that it is 
important for manufacturers to take a platform-
constructing strategy to survive in recent networked 
business environments.   
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